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We are delighted to introduce the first issue of 2019 of the Journal of Financial Management, 
Markets and Institutions, with a timely focus on corporate governance and risk management in 
financial institutions. One of the main lessons from the global financial crisis learned by financial 
institutions, policymaker and practitioners is the need to strengthen corporate governance, both in 
terms of the frameworks and related rules and in terms of the best practices of financial institutions. 
Since October 2010 the Basel Committee published a set of revised principles to promote enhanced 
corporate governance practices within European banks. However, despite the progress made, the 
Financial Stability Board’s review on corporate governance found in 2017 that the effectiveness of 
corporate governance framework can be impacted if the division of responsibility among financial 
sector regulators is unclear or if the various requirements overlap, leave unwarranted gaps, or are, 
otherwise, not well aligned with each other.  
Policymakers – both at the European and domestic level – have tried to address the perceived 
flaws of the existing bank governance structures with a series of initiatives to control bank risk-
taking. They have generally reinforced the governance requirements for banks focusing on the role 
and responsibilities of the management body for sound governance arrangements. Among various 
regulatory changes, the Directive 2013/36/EU stresses the importance of a robust supervisory 
function that challenges management decision-making and the need to establish and implement a 
sound risk strategy and risk management framework. Corporate governance and risk management 
are strongly linked as the management body is responsible, among other tasks, to implement a 
sound risk culture and to strengthen the risk management frameworks of banks. 
Academics have recently investigated the impact of corporate governance on bank risk-taking, 
establishing that weak corporate governance in banks leads to inadequate risk management, 
especially insufficient risk monitoring through the board. The latter is a factor that contributed 
significantly to the bank instabilities during the crisis and eventually led to actual bank failures. 
Recent academic contributions aimed at identifying efficient bank governance structures, and 
mostly converge with regulators’ recommendations. 
Also, banks have directed significant attention to improving corporate governance and risk 
adjustment practices. They focus more intensively on the impact of compensation and related 
performance management mechanisms can have on incentives, their corresponding risks and their 
implications for the long-term health of banks. These tools can play an essential role in addressing 
corporate governance flaws by providing both ex-ante incentives for ethical conduct and ex-post 
adjustment mechanisms that support appropriate accountability when an error occurs. 
The current issue collects some of the most relevant papers in terms of research questions, 
methodologies and policy implications presented at the International conference “Corporate 
Governance and Risk Management in financial institutions: how to move between sustainable 
management and performance goals?”, held at the University of Foggia in May, 2018.  
The first article is entitled “The peculiarity of the Cooperative and mutual model: evidence from 
the European banking sector” by Vincenzo Pacelli, Francesca Pampurini and Stefania Sylos Labini. 
It focuses on the European mutual banks' industry which encompasses a specific business model, 
and corporate governance structure. According to the authors, these features have probably allowed 
mutual banks to withstand the financial crisis better. More specifically, this article investigates the 
cost efficiency of European mutual banks using a sample which includes all the banks operating in 
Italy, Germany, France, and Spain over the period 2011-2016. The authors employ a stochastic 
approach to determine the effects of the recent financial crisis on the efficiency level of mutual 
banks, to investigate whether the mutual bank business model may be still attractive nowadays. The 
main contribution of the paper is the assessment of the impact of the financial crisis on mutual 
banks’ cost efficiency in the EU. Their results also contribute to the recent debate about the 
cooperative and mutual banking system and its raison d’être. The paper supports the view that 
European mutual banks are more cost efficient as compared to commercial banks.  
The second contribution to this issue is “How Do You Disclose? Some Evidence On It 
Governance In European Banking System” by Sabrina Leo, Claudia Panetta, Fabrizio Santoboni 
and Gianfranco Vento. This article is an empirical contribution that examines trends in banks’ IT 
governance using IT public disclosure and stays in the less explored strand of literature on IT 
governance transparency. IT governance is of particular relevance for regulators and banks as the 
greater diffusion and complexity of IT pose new challenges to the financial sector. The authors 
suggest that IT processes should be fully integrated into all business processes, especially into risk 
management. In principle, this article reviews IT governance after the crises and investigates 
whether the greater importance ascribed to IT governance is due to the external pressure or banks’ 
independent decisions. Then, it investigates the impact of IT governance disclosure on banks 
performance, finding a positive impact on banks’ charter value and cost efficiency. 
The third article of this volume deals with life insurance companies. It is entitled “Financial 
intermediaries’ asset-liability dependency and low-interest-rate environment: evidence from EU life 
insurers” by Nicola Borri, Rosaria Cerrone, Rosa Cocozza, and Domenico Curcio. This article 
studies the relationships between asset and liability sides of life insurers’ balance sheet in a low 
market rates framework. By using canonical correlation analysis, the authors analyze the 
relationship within and between the asset and liability sides of 24 major European Union life 
insurers over the 2007-2015 period. The authors find strong evidence that life insurers’ assets and 
liabilities have become more independent over time. They argue that the declining trend of market 
interest rates fosters this phenomenon, and has made insurance companies more exposed to ALM-
related risks.  
The fourth article is “Sustainable compensation and economic performance: an empirical 
analysis on European banks” by Elisabetta D'Apolito, Antonia Patrizia Iannuzzi, Edgardo Sica, and 
Stefania Sylos Labini. This article investigates the financial and non-financial impacts of the use of 
sustainability criteria in banks’ executive compensation plans. The sample covers the globally and 
systemically important European banks over the period 2013-2017. The implementation of 
sustainable criteria in the banks’ remuneration contracts negatively affected economic performance, 
and the risk profile. It positively impacts sustainability performance. These findings have important 
implications for investors, as well as banks. Indeed, these results are encouraging for the use of 
sustainability targets in executive compensation for restricting excessive risk-taking behaviours and 
improving sustainability performance. 
The current issue closes with a commentary entitled “Corporate Governance in the European 
Banking Sector: some remarks on diversity” by Francesca Arnaboldi. The commentary discusses 
some of the critical aspects of bank corporate governance in the EU. Enhancing sound corporate 
governance practices has become one of the major concerns in the supervisory authority’s agenda 
and one of the critical features to evaluate banks’ stability. The global rethinking about corporate 
governance rules has translated into a stronger focus on board diversity for EU banks. The existing 
literature and sound corporate governance practices support the view that different types of board 
members may bring different capabilities to their banks. Even if board diversity may add 
complexity to the functioning of the board, the advantages it brings are of utmost importance in the 
challenging environment banks are facing. The author highlights the fragmentation of the EU 
corporate governance rules as banks have to comply with 27 sets of different regulations and codes. 
This complexity should not be ignored, as member states’ specificities, legal systems, and a more 
general openness to diversity influence the effect reforms may have on banks’ performance and 
stability. 
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